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ARTICLES

International Governance Through
Trade Agreements: Patent Protection
for Essential Medicines
Judy Rein*
I. INTRODUCTION
With the internationalization of infectious disease, increased globalization of economic transactions, and technological innovation, we are at a
critical juncture in decision-making about pharmaceutical regulation. Advances in medical research have yielded significant improvements in treating diseases that only recently were incurable. This is most stunning in the
area of AIDS treatments. Significant public and private investment, particularly in the United States, converted this killer into a manageable
chronic disorder for many in the developed world. Simultaneously, an explosion in the infection rate in poor countries has made AIDS a largely developing world disease. As a result, the high-priced life saving drugs are
largely unavailable to what amounts to 90% of the infected population.
* Paper written for Fellowship, Center for International Studies, New York University
School of Law.
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The devastation of the AIDS pandemic and the management of a public health solution present a daunting challenge to global governance on
many fronts. A critical source of conflict at the end of the millennium arose
from the tension between forces favoring preservation of commercial interest in patent rights and the compelling need for poorer countries to get access to safe medicines at an affordable price. Inaccessibly priced medicines
are at the core of a dispute that is not only North-South, but also mobilizes
transnational actors, such as AIDS treatment advocates and industry proponents. A combination of the market, state regulation of patent monopolies,
and intergovernmental trade regimes manages distributional outcomes.
However, this governance structure poorly responds to this particular instance of market failure. As with many problems involving economic governance at the global level, there is a gap between the representative organs
that make up the regulatory frameworks (intergovernmental negotiators acting for nationally determined economic interests) and the breadth of interests, constituted both transnationally and domestically, that are stakeholders
in policy outcomes.
InternationalTrade
The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(CNAFTA")I and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") 2 represented a significant departure from traditional multilateral trade diplomacy. From its creation in 1947, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT') operated through a process of
negotiating tariff reductions on goods. In the 1990s, this gradual reduction
of tariff (and some non-tariff) barriers to the free flow of commodities was
supplemented with the establishment of enforceable global standards governing intellectual property.
The inclusion of intellectual property rights as a critical aspect of trade
negotiations flowed logically from the explosive growth of value generated
by intellectual property in industries such as software and biotechnology.
Strong intellectual property protections in an otherwise unregulated market
are rationalized as necessary interventions to encourage innovation by guaranteeing sufficient return on investment in the development of intellectual
property. Rights holders are then able to enjoy monopoly rents on their inventions, a policy which must be balanced with opposing social goals of
promoting competition and affordability of consumer goods. By establishing positive protection of "rights" for investors in innovation, the global
'North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
2Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter Marrakesh
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND Vol. 31,
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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trade regime governs the complex balance of interests between intellectual
property owners, second-comers in the market, and consumers.
Managing this balance is particularly tricky in the case of pharmaceuticals. Unlike most other consumer goods, access to essential medicines is a
basic human need, and an important aspect of many national health policies.
According to the World Health Organization ("WHO"), access involves
three components: therapeutic access (the discovery and development of
appropriate treatments), physical access, and financial access. Financial
access is greatly affected by the ability of pharmaceutical companies to exercise monopoly control of pricing through exclusive patent rights. At the
level of international trade diplomacy, the tradeoff between protection and
access takes on a North-South dimension. Where comparative advantage
depends on monopoly of intellectual property, developing countries are at a
distinct disadvantage. Once intellectual property is part of the international
trade regime, the dynamics of access to essential pharmaceuticals can be
shaped in this arena. 4 Through active lobbying, international pharmaceutical companies succeeded in ob"
g a high level of pharmaceutical patent
protections in the trade agreements. Increasingly, poor countries affected
by the AIDS pandemic and international health organizations actively have
sought to preserve state regulatory powers within the confines of the TRIPS
agreement.6 However, these efforts have been met with considerable resistance, particularly from the United States, which has engaged in aggressive

3

See generallyWorld Health Organization, at http//:www.who.int (ast modified Mar. 6,
2001).
4See Sara Dillon, Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the DeathofDomestic PoliticalConstituencies, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 197, 203 - 203 (1999) (arguing that increased legalism at the

international level has eclipsed the ability of domestic constituencies to affect national policies).
5 See Robert Weissman, Long Strange Trips: The PharmaceuticalIndustry Drive to
Harmonize Global IntellectualPropertyRules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives
Available
to Third World Countries, 17 U. PENN. J. INT'L LAW 1069 (1996).
6
See Revised Drug Strategy, Res. WHA 52.19, Fifty-Second World Health Assembly,
May 24, 1999.
Recognizing that the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides scope for the protection of public health;
Taking note of concerns of many Member States about the impact of relevant international agreements, including trade agreements, on local manufacturing capacity
and on access to and prices of pharmaceuticals in developing and least developed
countries;
1. URGES Member States:...
(3) to explore and review their options under relevant international agreements,
including trade agreements, to safeguard access to essential drugs.
Id.
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unilateral action to extend patent protection beyond the international
agreements.7
This paper examines the current conflicts surrounding the implementation of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Part II outlines the specifics
of trade agreements shaping the global intellectual property regime and the
consequences for governments seeking to devise an essential drugs policy.
Part III analyzes the process of obtaining consensus and compliance with
patent protection rules through the negotiation and implementation of trade
agreements, and the utilization of dispute settlement mechanisms. This section also examines the aggressive application of unilateral measures to induce adherence to levels of protection beyond those established at the
multilateral and regional level. Part IV considers alternative approaches for
international governance of pharmaceuticals that aim to maximize equitable
outcomes while preserving incentives for innovation.
II. HARMONIZATION OF PATENT REGIMES
The InteractionofRegional andMultilateralInitiatives
The core GATT principles of national treatment and most favored nation status are incorporated in the two agreements. Both TRIPS and
NAFTA provide that each Member (or "Party" in the case of NAFTA) requires that nationals of other participating states may not be treated less favorably in domestic protection and enforcement of intellectual property
legislation! Most-favored-nation treatment (included in Article 4 of the
TRIPS) mandates that any advantage conferred to one member country
must be extended to all other member countries. However, trade advantages provided within NAFTA most likely are not required to be extended
to GATT members. The exception provided within the GATT, permitting
customs unions and free trade areas, will probably be applied to World
Trade Organization ("WTO") agreements. 9
Although the increase in regional trade integration initiatives in the
1980s raised concerns about potential weakening of the multilateral frame7See Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Announces Results of Special 301 AnnualReview (Apr. 30, 1999), at http://www.ustr.gov/releasesl1999/04/99-41.html

[hereinafter
Special 301 Annual Review].
8
TRIPS,supra note 2, art. 3; NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1703.
9General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, Art. XXIV [hereinafter GATT]. See generally J.H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards of IntellectualPropertyProtection under the TRIPS Component of the
WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Carlos M. Correa
& Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998). But see Frederick M. Abbott, LAW AND POLICY OF
REGIONAL INTEGRATION 95-96 (1995) (arguing that because the TRIPS agreement itself does

not contain an exemption for regional integration areas, higher levels of protection within
NAFTA should extend to certain countries).

382
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work, this largely has proven to be of limited significance, especially with
the strengthening of the multilateral system through conclusion of the Uru° Rather, at least for the purposes considered
guay Round of the GATT.'
here, the shift in U.S. emphasis toward the North American trade arrangement served to bolster its intellectual property agenda at the multilateral
level." The NAFTA Chapter 17 provisions were negotiated at the same
time as TRIPS by mostly the same people, so much of the language in the
two agreements is virtually identical or strikingly similar. 12 Intellectual
property was included in the GATT Uruguay Round and the NAFTA due to
U.S. insistence.' 3 Although they are largely the same, the United States was
more successful at securing its agenda in the NAFTA accord than in TRIPS.
4
NAFTA Chapter 17 provisions are often referred to as "TRIPS-plus."'
Minimum Standards
The TRIPS and NAFTA intellectual property provisions are exceptional instances of the imposition of minimum standards on domestic legal
systems.' 5 Other aspects of the trade agreements that address domestic
regulatory regimes, such as the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade
and on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 16 mandate
limiting constraints on regulations for technical or health purposes. The objective of those provisions is reducing non-tariff barriers to trade, rather
than creating internationally enforceable domestic regimes to protect technical and sanitary conditions.' 7 The NAFTA Supplemental Agreements on
1oSee Roy Maclaren, The Geo-Political ChangesDuring the 1980s and Their Influence
on the GATT,in Tm URUGUAY RoUND AND BEYOND 189 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias
Hirsch eds., 1998). See generally MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM AFTER THE
URUGUAY RoUND (Riccardo Faini &Enzo Grilli eds., 1997).

" See James A.R. Nafziger, NAFTA's Regime for Intellectual Property: In the Mainstream of Public International Law, in UNAM/ASIL, EL PAPEL DEL DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL EN AMERICA: LA SOBERANIA NACIONAL EN LA ERA DE LA INTEGRACION

REGIONAL 377, 384 (1997).

12See Joseph Papovich , NAF7A 's ProvisionsRegardingIntellectual Property:Are They

Working as Intended? -A US. Perspective,23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253 (1997). Joseph Papovich
served as the Deputy Assistant Trade Representative for Intellectual Property in the Office of

the U.S. Trade Representative.
13See id. at 254.

14See Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, Investment and ProtectionAgreements and the World Trade Organization,23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261,
266 (1997).
15The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMS"), part of the Marrakesh Agreement, also establishes positive requirements, but it does not entail the same
quantity of elaboration with respect to highly specific harmonizing rules.
16These were also included in the Marrakesh Agreement. See NAFTA, supranote 1, ch.
9, Standards Related Measures.
17See Hertz, supra note 14, at 266 (citing Frieder Roessler, former Director of the WTO

Secretariat's Legal Affairs Division).
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do require that parties enforce positive labor

and environmental standards, but those agreements only require the enforcement of domestic laws, not the revision of domestic laws to meet an
internationally negotiated standard. At most, the Supplemental Agreements
contain vague aspirational statements about enacting protective legislation.19 By contrast, both the TRIPS and Chapter 17 of NAFTA contain
fairly detailed requirements for levels of domestic regulation of intellectual
property rights. In both cases, parties may provide more extensive coverage
to property rights than required by the Agreements. 20
Rights ofPatent-holders

The substantive provisions most relevant to pharmaceuticals are found
in Section 5 of the TRIPS, and in NAFTA Article 1709 covering patents.
TRIPS provides that patent holders are to receive the exclusive rights to
prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the product or process without the owner's consent.2 ' Rights articulated in NAFTA are similar, but do not include the prevention of third
parties from importing patented products, only from importing products derived from patented processes. This omission avoids directly addressing
the problem of parallel imports, or "gray market" goods. The TRIPS similarly skirts the issue by referring to Article 6, which states that "[flor purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement . . . nothing in this

Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights."23 Exhaustion of rights doctrine holds that once a
rights holder introduces protected goods into the stream of commerce, there
is no restriction on how the goods may be further distributed. The practice
of parallel imports involves the importation of lawfully made products that
were not intended for distribution in the country importing the goods.24
18 See NAFTA, North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993.
19For example, Article 3 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation provides as follows:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic environmental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly
its environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and
regulations provide high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations.
Abbott, supranote 9, at 109-12.
20 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1 (1); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1702.
21TRIPS, supranote 2, art 28.
22
NAFTA supranote 1, art. 1709(a).
2 TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 28 (1)(aXn. 6).
24 See Laurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual
PropertyNorms in InternationalTradingAgreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLICY 769,
810-11 (1997).
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This loophole/ambiguity is especially relevant to the parallel importation of
pharmaceuticals, as there are significant price differentials on the same
medicines legally produced in, or exported to, different countries. 25
By practicing market segmentation, pharmaceutical companies may
seek to maximize potential marginal returns in countries with low purchasing power, while preserving high prices in stronger markets. Advocates of
restricting parallel importation of medicines claim that such a strategy
would encourage companies to sell at below world market prices to poorer
countries. However, in practice, poor countries are not necessarily the
beneficiaries of market segmentation. The ability to shop the world market
offers consumers the advantage of price negotiating leverage with companies .26
Under TRIPS, the term of patent protection is established at a minimum of twenty years from the filing date. 27 NAFTA provides for twenty
years from filing, or, alternatively, seventeen years from the date of the patent grant, as had been the longstanding U.S. policy. 28 In implementing the
TRIPS agreement, the United States revised its patent protection period to
conform with the single TRIPS standard. 29 The only other change to the
U.S. patent scheme required by the agreements was nondiscrimination on
the basis of place of invention. Drugs developed in other countries must
now be afforded national treatment with respect to patent approval3.
The agreements also include extensive norms for the domestic enforcement of property rights. Unlike the substantive provisions, they do not
articulate specific rules, but rather general standards to allow for local differences.3 1 The rules cover procedural matters, such as timely, evidence2 Price differentials are usually the result of varied approaches to price regulation in different countries. Parallel importing of pharmaceuticals is widely practiced within the European Union. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, PHAnm.cEUTIcAL PRICE REGULATION 84-88 (1997)
(arguing that savings from parallel importation usually accrue to intermediaries rather than to
consumers).
26
See Mohamed Lahouel and Keith Maskus, Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries:Interests in UnilateralInitiatives and a WTO Agree-

ment, WORLD BANK GLOBAL

CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MILLENNIUM

ROUND
27 (Sep. 20-21, 1999), athttpJ/redem.buap.mx/rml9.htm.
TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 32.
28
NAFTA, supranote 1,art 1709 (12).
29
See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §532(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4809,
4984 (1994) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)); see also Weissman, supranote 5, at 1074.
30 The European Union has asserted that nonetheless, delays in commercialization of medicinal products developed in Europe are still longer than of U.S.-tested products, in part because of the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval procedures. See EUROPEAN
COMM ssION, 1999 REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 25
(Aug. 1999), at http://europaeu.intlcomm/extemal_relationsus/trade-barriers_.report_99/usr
bt 99.pdf.
31 For a discussion of the challenges posed by the difficult fit between domestic rules falling within TRIPS and the dispute settlement mechanisms covering the WTO in general, see
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based judicial and administrative enforcement, the availability of judicial
review, and the provision of civil and criminal penalties. 2
Regulation ofPharmaceuticalPatents
Patentable subject matter is broadly conferred to "any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application. 3 3 In legal actions involving infringement of a process patent, the
agreements shift the burden of proof to the defendant 4 Discrimination as
to place of invention, the field of technology, and whether products are imported or locally produced is proscribed.35
These provisions imply a significant retooling of the patent registration
and enforcement systems of many countries. Prior to the agreements, some
countries only protected pharmaceutical processes, but not products, thus
allowing generic drug makers to legally produce substances similar to patented medicines through a distinct process.36 India implemented this
method in its Patents Act of 1970 and developed a thriving generic pharmaceutical industry producing cheap medicines.3 7 Until recently, some countries in the developing world, such as Brazil, did not extend any patent
protection to pharmaceuticals. 38 Additionally, the equal level of protection
mandated for imports and locally manufactured products eliminates a domestic tool for promoting direct investment and technology transfer. With
the right to supply imports protected, national governments may not legislate "work-the-patent" rules limiting patents to products manufactured lo-

generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Andreas Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay
32 Round, Putting TRIPS and DisputeSettlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997).
See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1714-1717; TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 41-50.
33
TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 27 (1); NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1709 (1).
34 See TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 34; NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1709 (10).
35 See TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 27 (1); NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1709 (7).
36
According to one study, prior to TRIPS, only 45% of developing countries recognized
pharmaceutical product patents. Those that did so had much shorter periods of protection
than the twenty-year consensus emerging in the developed countries. See German
Velasquez and Pascale Boulet, Essential Drugs in the New InternationalEconomic Environment,3 BULLETIN OF Tim WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 288, 289 (1999).
37
See Elizabeth Henderson, TRIPS and the Third World: the Example of Pharmaceutical
Patents in India, 11 EuR. INTELL. PRop. RFV. 651, 657-58 (1997). Henderson notes that because of shorter patents for pharmaceuticals than for other technology (five to seven, rather
than fourteen years), and the delay in bringing pharmaceuticals to market (up to eight years)
there
38 has been no effective patent protection for pharmaceuticals in India.
In 1996, Brazil passed legislation that brought pharmaceutical protection in compliance
with the TRIPS requirements. See Theresa Beeby Lewis, PatentProtectionfor the PharmaceuticalIndustry:A Survey ofthe PatentLawsof Various Countries,30 INT'L LAw. 835, 860
(1996).
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cally, as had been permitted under the Paris Convention.39 Importation of a
patented product is thus considered sufficient to meet any requirements that
a patent be "worked".
Both agreements contain special pipeline provisions covering pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products for countries that had not provided patent protection prior to the agreements coming into force. In the
case of NAFTA, parties are required to offer patent protection for the remainder of the patent term granted in another party, as long as the product
4
has not already been marketed in the country newly offering protection. 0
The TRIPS provision, by contrast, allows countries to ease in patent protection of these areas. It requires that a filing procedure, or "mailbox" system,
be established so that the subsequent patent grant will be counted from the
filing date. 4 ' This requirement only covers those patents filed from the date
of the enforcement of the agreement. 42 A product that is the subject of the
patent application must be accorded up to five years of exclusive marketing
rights until the patent application is granted or rejected. 43 Although developing countries are not required to have a fully compliant patent system until 2005, 44 the pipeline requirement for pharmaceuticals expedites the
effective recognition of patents, by preserving the place in line for registration and mandating exclusive marketing in the interim.
BalancingPatentProtectionwith Social Needs
Despite the unprecedented level of positive rulemaking, the intellectual
property provisions of the trade agreements leave substantial room for
countries to exercise regulatory control over pharmaceutical pricing. In addition to the omission of any express prohibition on the use of parallel imports, there is nothing in the agreements to bar the use of price controls, a
common practice in developed countries, with the exception of the United
States. 45

39 See Reichman, supra note 9, at 352 (citing Paris Convention for the Protection of InProperty, art. 5A).
dustrial
40
NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1709 (4).
41 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 70 (8).
42
See id.
43
See id. art. 70 (9).
44 See id. art. 65 (4), which provides a 10 year transition period for developing countries
which
previously did not protect pharmaceuticals to implement a product patent system.
45 The
wide differentials in pricing between the United States and other countries, and
among purchasers within the United States is a groving political problem for international
pharmaceutical companies. See, e.g., Jeff Gerth and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Drug Makers
Reap Profits On Tax-Backed Research,N.Y. TnMEs, Apr. 23, 2000, at Al (offering the example of a six-week supply of a glaucoma drug that costs a French patient $18.78, U.S. federal agencies $25.37, and a U.S. patient purchasing in a drugstore $49.69.)
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Exceptions to the rigorous standards are also specified. 46 TRIPS explicitly acknowledges the necessity of considering public interest, and specifically health policy, in formulating domestic intellectual property
regulations. In its General Provisions and Basic Principles, the agreement
allows Members to "adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to
their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 'A7 The
Agreement further acknowledges the principle that intellectual property
rights must be limited so as not to be abused in the restraint of trade or "adversely affect the international transfer of technology. '" 8 With the exception of competition policy, these provisions are not included in the NAFTA
agreement.
Members may exclude patents for inventions where the exclusion is
needed to protect public order or morality, including to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, or to avoid environmental injury. This statement is predicated, however, on the condition that no commercial use of the
invention is permitted in the territory. 49 This exception lends little support
to exempting essential drugs from patent protection requirements under the
Agreement. The public order exception essentially authorizes a state to
deny patents to harmful substances that are banned for reasons of health,
safety, or environmental protection. Robert Weissman suggests that a government pursuing an essential drugs policy can obviate the requirement that
no commercial use be allowed in the territory by denying patentability and
producing and distributing the target medications through a public or nonprofit entity or network. Such a scheme also would require the prohibition
of all non-public commercial exploitation of the substance. This seems to
be a stretch of the concept underlying "ordrepublic" and probably does not
fall within the provision, which states that the exclusion Scannot be made
"merely because the exploitation is prohibited by... law."
Additionally, diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the
treatment of humans or animals, and plants, animals other than micro46 See TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 30; NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (5):
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal ex-

ploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.
7

4 TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 8 (1).

'Id. art.8 (2).

49

See id. art. 27 (2); NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1709 (2).
50TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27(2). Weissman argues extensively and creatively that a
country may be successful at asserting the 'necessary" nature of noncommercial exploitation
of essential medicines yet this tactic is inconsistent with the plain textual meaning of the

provision, which is to preclude patentability of harmful inventions, not inaccessibly priced
ones.

InternationalGovernance Through TradeAgreements
21:379 (2001)

organisms, and the biological processes for the production of plants or animals may be excluded.51 Although this provision also suggests a health exception principle in the Agreement, by its terms, it refers only to patenting
"methods" and actual life forms. The United States strongly opposed the
exclusion of life forms due to its interest in protecting the growing biotechof Article 27 was innology industry. The provision of a five-year review
52
cluded in the final draft of the TRIPS agreement.
Compulsory licensing
Compulsory licensing of patents is one of the most contentious issues
in intellectual property regulation. A compulsory or mandatory license
waives the patent holder's normally exclusive right to the invention, usually
under specified conditions, such as non-utilization, abuses in the restraint of
trade, or other circumstances creating a public interest in wider availability.53 Payment of a royalty to the patent-holder is usually required. Compulsory licensing schemes are used to control pharmaceutical prices by
allowing generic producers into the market before the patent expiration of
brand-name drugs. In the period that Canada instituted compulsory licensing for pharmaceuticals (especially 1969-1987), drug prices dropped significantly. 54 The United States consistently has opposed any form of
compulsory licensing, except perhaps in extreme situations involving national security. The compulsory licensing provisions in the agreements represent a compromise to developing country interests.
Compulsory licensing is permitted under Article 31 of TRIPS and Article 1709 (10) in NAFTA, but is subject to a number of restrictions. Authorization for use of a patent without the consent of the right holder must
be considered on its individual merits.55 Efforts to obtain a license from the
rights holder on reasonable terms for a reasonable period of time must be
made before a compulsory license may be granted. 6 Significantly, prior effort to obtain consent from the right holder may be waived "in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases
of public non-commercial use.",57 However, the patent holder must be paid
51See id. art. 27 (a) and (b); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (3).

Kevin W. McCabe, The January1999 Review ofArticle 27 of the TRIPS Agreement: Diverging Views ofDeveloped and Developing Countries Toward the Patentabilityof
Biotechnology,6 1. INELL. PRop. L. 41,45 (1998).
53See F.M. ScHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 5
(1977).
5 See Patricia L Carter, FederalRegulation ofPharmaceuticalsin the UnitedStates and
Canada,21 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 215, 240-45 (1999). Under challenge from U.S.
pharmaceutical companies, Canadian courts upheld the payment of a 4% royalty by generic
producers to the brand-name patent-holders.
55See TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 31 (a); NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1709 (10) (a).
5See TRIPS, supranote 2, art. 31 (b); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (10) (b).
52See

57id.

389
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adequate remuneration, 5 and all decisions relating to the compulsory license must be subject to independent review. 5 9 Production under the compulsory license must be for domestic consumption, not export. 6°
Development Lag
The TRIPS accord also makes some concessions to the particular needs
of developing countries that lack the administrative infrastructure to implement a sophisticated pharmaceutical patent system. Developing country
Members of the WTO are granted a ten year transitional period to bring
domestic law into compliance with the requirements for product patent protections in TRIPS Article 65 (4). There is no transition period in NAFTA,
but Mexico has three years to make enforcement fully operational. 61 Finally, Article 66 of TRIPS calls upon developed country Members to provide incentives to locally-based enterprises for the purpose of encouraging
technology transfer to the least developed countries. This particular mandate does not provide any specific requirements or objectives. There is no
similar exhortation in NAFTA.
Advocates for implementing a strong intellectual property regime in
developing countries often maintain that it is in the best interest of those
countries to adopt a high level of protection. This theory holds that patent
protection will encourage technologically sophisticated investment in poor
countries, leading to a diffusion of technology, if investors can be assured
that they can restrict employees from transferring this technology to other
employers. There is no reason to believe, however, that offering patent protection will encourage rights holders to "work the patent" in a particular
country, if the rights are sufficient to preserve a monopoly
on the import
62
market, as is the case with both TRIPS and NAFTA.
III. CREATING CONDITIONS FOR COMPLIANCE
Although with both agreements, U.S. negotiators encountered resistance to the protection of intellectual property in general, and in particular,
58 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (h); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (10) (h).
59
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (i)-(j); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (10) (i) and (j).
60
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (f); NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1709 (f). Incidental
export apparently would be tolerated, as the language states specifically that authorization
shall
extend "predominantly" to the domestic market.
61
NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1718.14.
62
A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-NaturalRights and a "PoliteForm of Economic Imperialism," 29 V.ND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 450-52 (1996). Oddi argues persuasively that there

is no strong economic policy justification for the particular rules embodied within TRIPS,
especially the 20 years of patent protection and the mandatory inclusion of a broad area of
subject matter. The only rationale for this type of patent regime stems from an implicit
natural rights theory underpinning the position taken by the developed countries, particularly

U.S. negotiators.
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pharmaceutical patent protection, the NAFTA provisions were easier to obtain both in negotiation and implementation. Undoubtedly, it is easier to
obtain at a regional or subregional level what may seem insurmountable at a
multilateral level. Chapter 17 provisions were negotiated in one year,
whereas TRIPS dragged on for six years, and was only finalized after the
NAFTA was already signed. Harmonization of patent rules under NAFTA
was essentially accomplished as part of the negotiation and ratification process. The TRIPS implementation process, on the other hand, involving
more gradual phase-in of patent protections, has generated more disputes.
A. Negotiation
NAFTA

63

The bilateral Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement ("FTA"),
was the precursor to NAFTA. Of special concern to the U.S. FTA negotiators was Canada's 1969 patent law that contained provisions for the liberal
use of compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals at any time during the patent, and only protected processes, not products. 64 Although a draft of that
agreement included specific intellectual property provisions, during the negotiation process, Canada obligingly passed a revised Patent Act that deferred the authority to issue a compulsory license on imported
pharmaceuticals for seven to ten years. 65 The Canadian reform was partially motivated by the concern that lax protection of pharmaceutical intellectual property was discouraging international investment in research and
development of new medicines. U.S. pharmaceutical companies offered to
increase investment in Canadian medical research in exchange for greater
patent protection. 66 The final version of the FTA only contained a commitment to future efforts at creating an intellectual property agreement. 67
As a result of the NAFTA negotiations, the Canadian Parliament once again
reformed its pharmaceutical patent law, bringing it closer in conformity to
the U.S. scheme.68
63

Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987,27 IL.M. 281 (1988).
For a detailed history of the pre-NAFTA Canadian drug patent regime, see John W.
Rogers II, The Revised CanadianPatentAct, the Free Trade Agreement, and Pharmaceutical Patents: An Overview of PharmaceuticalCompulsory Licensing in Canada, 10 EuR.
INTELL.
PRop. RFv. 351 (1990).
65
See id. at 356 (citing Bill C-22, of the 33d parliament, 2d Sess., 35-36 Eliz. 11 (1986 to
1987)).
66
See Carter,supranote 54, at 241-42.
67See Rogers, supra note 64, at 353, n.31. Article 2004 of the FTA states: "the parties
shall cooperate in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and in other international forums to improve the protection of intellectual property." Id.
6 See Carter, supra note 54, at 243, (citing An Act to Amend the Patent Act, S.C., ch. 2,
§ 3 (1993); Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P4, § 39 (1997) ("Bill C-91"). The new lav eliminated
the compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and extended patent protection of pharmaceuticals from 17 to 20 years.
64
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Mexico also passed legislation to bring patent protection in compliance
with NAFTA in anticipation of its signing. 69 Patent protection was extended to both pharmaceutical products (previously unprotected) and processes. Subsequently published regulations clarified the limited use of
compulsory licenses for failures to work the patent (whether through local
manufacture or importation). A compulsory license can be requested when
the patent holder has not executed the exploitation of the patented product 7°
or process after three years from the issue of the patent or four from the application filing date. Additionally, public utility licenses may be granted for
emergency causes or national security, as long as the license does not raise
prices or hinder production or distribution of basic needs goods. 7' To date,
no compulsory license has been granted.
Both Mexico and Canada are now compliant, but U.S. pharmaceutical
companies are concerned about the use of price controls (which are legal
under both NAFTA and TRIPS), Mexico's failure to expressly prohibit parallel imports (also legal under the agreements), and mandated generic prescribing, which the industry claims infringes trademark protections.7
TRIPS
Intellectual property was first introduced into multilateral trade negotiations by the United States at the opening of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT at Punta del Este in 1986. In response to growing insistence by developed countries to include intellectual property within the GATT, a group
of developing countries led by Brazil and India offered a draft intellectual
property agreement that proposed obligations consistent with the thencurrent practice in the developing world with respect to patents 73 However,
it was the draft put forth by the United States, the European Economic
Community, and Switzerland that largely outlined the terms eventually
adopted. 74 After a period of impasse, the developing countries (with the
strong exception of India) began to shift toward accepting the northern
69

See Ley de Propiedad Industrial, D.O., 27 de junio de 1991, amended by D.O., 2 de
de 1994.
agosto
70
See Reglamento de la ley de Propiedad Industrial, D.O. art. 50-52 (Nov. 23, 1994),
also availableat 2G WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 165 (2000).
71 See id.

7 See PhRMA, Issues & Policy Watch: Mexico, at http://www.phrma.org/issues/nte/me
xico.html (Sept. 26, 1999) (photocopy on file with author); see also PhRMA, Issues & Policy Watch: Canada, at http://www.phrma.org/issuesnte/canada.html (Sept. 26, 1999) (photocopy on file with author).
73 The prevailing view at the outset of negotiations considered the creation of maximum,

rather than minimum, standards to limit the degree that countries could implement protectionist policies. See Reicnan, supra note 9, at 24.
74
See Roy Maclaren, The Geo-PoliticalChanges Duringthe 19809s and Their Influence
on the GATT, in THE URUGUAY RouNDt AND BEY OND, supra note 10, at 44.
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countries' scheme. 75 The successful adoption of TRIPS resulted from several factors. First, developing countries obtained concessions on textiles,
clothing, and some agricultural products in exchange for agreeing to higher
levels of intellectual property protection. 76 Second, changing geopolitical
realities, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, softened resistance to intellectual property protection. 77
Most importantly, bilateral pressures made acceptance of the developed countries' intellectual property agenda a necessity for some. 78 For example, the United States threatened unilateral trade sanctions under §301 of
the U.S. trade law79 in retaliation against Brazil for its failure to protect
pharmaceutical products and processes.8 ° A spokesperson for the Pharmaceutical Manufactures Association ("PMA"), the complainant that brought
the charge to the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR"), stated that Brazil is
the "global leader in its opposition to patent protection [for pharmaceuticals.] We hope the imposition of this sanction... will impress upon Brazil
the seriousness with which the United States views the unauthorized appropriation of its citizens' intellectual property."8 Despite U.S. resistance,
Brazil sought the establishment of a GATT panel to investigate whether the
100% tariff on a basket of Brazilian exports, including paper products and
consumer electronics, was legal within the then-established GATT.1 2 Although the Brazilian case was strongly supported within the GATT membership, it was abandoned in the face of the influence of U.S. market
strength. The punitive tariffs were terminated after the Brazilian President
announced the introduction of legislation to provide patent protection for
pharmaceuticals.8 3
Finally, some compromises to developing country concerns were included in the final draft. These included the exclusion of patents on life
7'See id.
76 See

generally MULTILATERALISM

AND REGIONALISM AF=ER THE URUGUAY ROUND, su-

pranote 10.
77 See Roy Maclaren, The Geo-PoliticalChangesDuring the 19809s and Their Influence
on the GA77, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND, supra note 10, at 44.
78
See id. at 45.
71 See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West Supp. 2000). Section 301 au-

thorizes the U.S. Administration to take action against any foreign country practices it determines to be discriminatory or restrictive of U.S. commerce.
80
See Reagan, ChargingPatent Piracy,Imposes Sanctions on $39 Million of Brazilian
Goods,
5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1415 (Oct. 26, 1988).
81
Id.

GATT art. XXIII. GATT panels were the precursor to the current and more binding
WTO dispute settlement body. Because panels could be blocked and consensus was required
for the adoption of decisions, countries enjoyed essential veto power over the establishment
of panels and adoption of results. See the discussion of dispute settlement, infra, for further
information.
83
See Determination to Terminate Increased Duties on Certain Articles From Brazil, 55
Fed. Reg. 27,324 (Jul. 2, 1990).
8
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forms, the ten-year transition period for developing countries, and the allowance of compulsory licensing, albeit with stringent restrictions.

B. Dispute Settlement
Although in their substantive provisions, the regional and multilateral
trade regimes largely converge, resolution of disputes covered within the
agreements differ in several respects. NAFTA Chapter 17 and TRIPS both
rely fundamentally on domestic regimes to enforce the substantive and procedural laws each country has established to implement the agreements.
However, if a Member (or Party) fails to meet an intellectual property obligation, intergovernmental dispute resolution procedures can be pursued.
Chapter 20 of NAFTA and the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU")
of the WTO15 both establish permanent administrative bodies to manage
8 7 Failing s setdisputes 86 and consultation procedures to promoteofsettlement.
arbitration panels.f
establishment
the
request
may
tlement, countries
Under the WTO DSU, panels are empowered to render enforceable decisions. Appeals can be made to a standing Appellate Body.8 9 Claims for
breach of intellectual property obligations can be remedied by injunctions,
monetary damages, or forfeiture of infringing goods or some form of mutually acceptable compensation. Cross-sectoral retaliation in the form of punitive tariffs are available where a country does not comply with panel
decisions. Non-violation complaints arising from TRIPS were given a
moratorium until January 1, 2000.90
Panel decisions under NAFTA Chapter 20 are not binding. Parties are
called upon to reach a resolution consistent with the panel report, involving
termination of the NAFTA-illegal conduct or appropriate compensation.

supranote 2, arts. 27-3(b), 65-4, and 31.
See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 2.
86 The two bodies are the NAFTA Secretariat and Free Trade Commission and the WTO
84 See TRIPS,
85

Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB").
87 Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 404 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226, Art. 4 (1994) [hereinafter
1, art. 2006.
DSU];
88 NAFTA, supra note
NAFTA allows for disputes that arise under either the regional or multilateral agreement to be brought in either forum, but where there is disagreement among the Parties,
NAFTA will be the preferred forum. See NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 2005.
89 DSU Article 17-14 states: "An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the [DSB]
and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report .... "
90
See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 65. Non-violation complaints, or complaints alleging
nullification or impairment of benefits, refer to measures that are not facially inconsistent
with the TRIPS obligations, but have the effect of undermining them.
91See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2018.
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However, suspension of benefits against a nonconforming Party is allowed
if an agreement cannot be reached within thirty days of a panel report. 2
Investor-Government arbitration
An interesting, if little-noticed, feature of the NAFTA dispute resolution armature is Chapter 11, which provides for the private enforcement of
investment rights where a NAFTA Party is in breach of the substantive
standards for the treatment of foreign investment. Unlike the governmentto-government dispute resolution regime outlined in Chapter 20, this alternative dispute settlement mechanism involves investor-state arbitration.
Thus, if an individual investor is unable or unwilling to obtain diplomatic
action from his or her government, the investor may opt to initiate arbitration proceedings against the offending government. Additionally, investors
may choose Chapter 11 arbitration as an alternative to seeking domestic
remedies.
Tribunals are limited to awarding monetary damages; relief in the form
of overturning judgments or administrative or legislative actions is not
available. An investor seeking relief for a host government action may
choose between the World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID"); ICSID's Additional Facility Rules9 3; and
the rules of the United Nations Commission for the International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL" rules.) There is no judicial review of arbitral tribunals.
Proceedings are closed, and there is no publication of decisions or proceedings without consent of both parties. Thus, it is somewhat difficult to obtain information on the nature and outcome of these proceedings. Thus far,
there have been only a limited number of arbitrations under Chapter 11.94
In one recent case, the threat of bringing an investor action through Chapter
11 was sufficient to persuade the Canadian government to revoke a ban on
the importation and trade of a gasoline additive and to settle with the U.S.
producer. 95

See NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 2019.
Neither Canada nor Mexico are parties to the ICSID Convention, but have agreed to
handle disputes through the additional facility. See generally LEON E. TRAKMAN, DIspuTE
SETTLENIENT UNDER NAFTA 44-45 (1997).
94There ,vere only five arbitrations pending in April 2000. See List of Pending Cases,
(Apr.
2000), availableat http://vvv.worldbank'org/icsid/cases/pending.htm.
95See
Canadian Government Withdraws MMT Ban; Ethyl Drops Suit in Exchange For
$13 Million, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1280 (Jul. 22, 1998). Ethyl, the sole North American producer of the substance, alleged that political, not environmental, regulatory motivation was behind the ban. The Canadian government also faced suits from several provinces
alleging that the ban illegally restricted interprovincial trade.
92

93
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The definition of an "investment" that falls within Chapter 11 includes
intellectual property. 96 In effect, Chapter 11 provides for compensation of
foreign investors in the event of a "regulatory taking" in the host country. 97
Under the provisions covering expropriation and compensation, a Party that
has failed to protect intellectual property rights in accordance with Chapter
17 can be subject to arbitration." An arbitral judgment of the fair market
value of the lost investment and associated costs can be awarded to the aggrieved investor.99 There is no analogous facility within the WTO, where
all claims are of an intergovernmental nature. However, similar investor
protections have been considered within the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI").'0°
Cases
To date, there have been no actions within the NAFTA dispute framework regarding pharmaceuticals. The WTO, however, has become the locus of pharmaceutical patent protection controversies, several of which are
relevant to an emerging WTO case law of interest to developing countries
seeking to devise a TRIPS-compliant essential drugs policy. The provision
for pipeline protection to pharmaceuticals (and agricultural chemicals) in
countries that had not yet instituted a patent system was, understandably,
the first issue to generate disputes. The United States brought a complaint
against India for failing to provide "mailbox" priority filing for foreign
holders of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical patents as required by
TRIPS Art. 70 (8), and for not providing the exclusive marketing rights
mandated by Art. 79 (9). 1 1 The Panel found for the United States, and the
Appellate Body upheld the decision, ordering India to bring its laws into

96

See NAFTA, supranote 1, art. 1139(g): "real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other
business
purposes."
97
NAFTA, supra note 1, art 1110-1 provides: "no Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure
tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment .... "
98
However, the Agreement explicitly states that '"tis Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance,
revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen." NAFTA, supra
note 1, art. 1110-7.
99
Seeid. art. 1110-2.
100 See generally PETER S. WATSON ET AL., COMPLETING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
PROPOSALS FOR THE MILLENNIum ROUND 249-57 (1999). Negotiations within the Organiza-

tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") came to an end in December
1998 without a draft agreement, but the possibility of resumption was left open.
'01See WTO, India-PatentProtectionfor Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural Chemical
Products,WT/DD50/4 (Nov. 8, 1996).
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compliance. 0 2 India argued that it had complied with the pipeline and exclusive marketing provisions but that it had done so through an administrative act, rather than through legislation. In reviewing the Indian domestic
legal system, the Appellate Body concluded that the administrative procedures would not withstand legal challenge, as they were inconsistent with
India's Patent Act. 103
The Indian government had not been able to pass TRIPS-consistent
legislation through Parliament and had attempted to substitute an administrative act for the democratic process."04 Given its well-developed generic
medicines industry and the resulting availability of cheap medicines, resistance to introduction of TRIPS-level patent protection within India remains
strong. In 1999, India enacted permanent legislation establishing "mailbox"
filing procedures in compliance with the Appellate Body mandate.' 05 Although refraining from taking further action, the United States expressed
disappointment that the exclusive marketing provisions included some exceptions, such as the discretionary use of compulsory licensing.10 6
In May 1999, the United States requested formal consultations with
Argentina pursuant to WTO rules, alleging that Argentina also had failed to
implement the pipeline and exclusive marketing provisions. The United
States simultaneously sought consultations about a grandfather provision in
Canada's revised patent law. Patent applications filed before Oct. 1, 1989
run 17 years from
the date issued, rather than the 20 required under Article
107
33 of TRIPS.
In February of 1999, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO established a panel to examine Canada's pharmaceutical patent regime at the request of the European Union.'0 8 Canada's Bill C-91, passed in conjunction
with the NAFTA, allows generic producers of patented pharmaceuticals to
carry out experiments required for marketing approval, and for the manufacture and stockpiling of patented products six months before the patent
See WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997), available at
http://www.vto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/7428d.doc.
03
1 See Watson et aI., supra note 100, at 34 (noting the legal significance of the Appellate
Body's
close examination of the domestic legal system to determine compliance).
104 See generally Roy Maclaren, The Geo-PoliticalChangesDuringthe 19809s and Their
Influence on the GATT, in Tim URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND, supranote 10.
10 See India Complies With WFTO Ruling on TRTPs, FiN. Tmms, Mar. 11, 1999, available
at http:/vwwv.newsbulletirnorg/bulletins/getbuetin.CFMS]D=#India (on file with the
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
106See Special 301 Annual Review, supra note 7.
107See US. Requests Consultationsat WTO on Argentine, CanadianPatentProtection,
16 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 820 (Dec. 5, 1999).
108 See WTO, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities,
WT/DS 114/5 (Nov. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Requestfor the Establishment of a Panel]; see
also W/TO New Item: 1999 News Item, at http://vwv.wto.org/english/news_elnews99_e/l 1
4_5.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
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expiration without the approval of the patent holder.10 9 By encouraging the
market availability of generic products as soon as patents expire, the Canadian policy sought to strike a balance between the requirements of patent
protection and the social need of access to pharmaceuticals at an affordable
price." 0 The European Union alleged that this provision violated the
TRIPS requirements prohibiting unauthorized third parties from making or
using the protected good within the 20-year patent period."'
The WTO panel decision allowed for the Canadian "regulatory review"
exception to patent exclusivity as consistent with the established practice of
permitting use of patented substances for experimental purposes. However,
the panel found that the stockpiling of patented pharmaceuticals prior to
patent expiration did not fall within any of the TRIPS Article 30 "limited
exceptions." Even though the Canadian law prohibited introduction into the
market until the patent expiration date, manufacture for future commercial
sale constituted a competitive commercial activity that substantially curtailed the patent holders' exclusive rights to make and use, and was therefore in violation of Article 28.1 of TRIPS." 2 Although it is a "first world"
controversy, the outcome will impact the future policy of developing world
countries, such as South Africa, India, Argentina and3 Brazil, that have a sophisticated pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity."
If this last claim had been brought by a U.S.-based international pharmaceutical company, the enterprise itself could take action under NAFTA
Chapter 11 investor-state arbitration rules, rather than seek diplomatic representation. Although relief would be limited to monetary damages for the
presumed loss related to the "head start" afforded generic producers in the
Canadian system, an arbitral award in favor of the pharmaceutical company
could have the effect of chilling the application of those provisions.
C. The Limits of Compromise?
Although the United States successfully negotiated strong rights for the
multinational pharmaceutical industry within the regional and multilateral
trade agreements, it has continued to push the full agenda not achieved at
' 09 The United States instituted similar provisions (called 'Bolar" exemptions) under the

1984 Waxman-Hatch legislation, which allows generic competitors to manufacture small
amounts of a product still under patent for testing purposes. See Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C.A. § 156 (West 2000).
110 See WTO, Report of the Appellate Body: WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada,
WT/DSI 14/R (Mar. 17, 2000), availableat http://www.wto.org/English/lratop__!e/dispu__e/74
28d.doc [hereinafter W1TO DisputePanel Report].
"' See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 28-1(a) and 33; see also Requestfor the Establishment
ofa 1Panel,supra note 108.
'2See WTO DisputePanelReport, supranote 110.
11
3Although there is no formal precedential effect of WTO decisions, individual case
outcomes are widely viewed as having persuasive authority.
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those negotiations through bilateral relations.114 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)
defines as "unreasonable" any "act, policy, or practice ... which (i) denies
fair and equitable (ii) provision of adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country
may be in compliance vith the specific obligations of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights . . ." The weapon of
§ 301 sanctions against countries engaged in discriminatory trade practices
was augmented by the introduction of "Special 301" in 1988. Under Special 301 provisions, the USTR is required to prepare a list of "priority" foreign countries that are considered the worst offenders of intellectual
property rights. The USTR then enters into negotiations with these countries under the threat of sanctions. Less severe offenders are placed on
"priority watch" and "watch" lists to notify them that their level 1of
15 intellectual property protections are not satisfactory to the United States.
In the wake of U.S. unilateral retaliation against the European Union
during the pendency of a WTO dispute panel adjudication,11 6 the European
Union brought a complaint alleging that the unilateral actions established in
U.S. trade laws, §§ 301-310, do not comply with the WTO.'1 7 Although the
complaint centered on the timing of actions mandated under § 304, the report of the panel applies to actions taken with respect to intellectual property under § 310. Following the Appellate Body's India patent case ruling
that examination of municipal law is an appropriate inquiry, the panel nonetheless came to the opposite outcome in this case. The report notes that the
U.S. statute is facially inconsistent with article 23 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. It then goes on to analyze how this facial inconsistency is
cured by representations made to the Dispute Settlement Body by the
United States indicating that it has no intention of implementing the broad
discretion in the legislation in a VTO-inconsistent manner."" Thus, a
4

See Special 301 Annual Review, supra note 7 (noting that Special 301 was amended
with the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements "to clarify that a country can be
found to deny adequate and effective intellectual property protection even if it is in compliance with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement").
"' See, e.g., USTR Initiates WTO Consultationson IPR with Argentina, Canada,EU, 16
Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 763 (May 5, 1999).
6
1

1

See European Communities-Regimefor the Importation,Sale and Distributionof Ba-

nanas-Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU,WT/DS27/ARB (April 9, 1999), availableat http://wwwv.wto.org/english/tratope/disp
ue/distab
e.htm.
7
11 See TFIO Dispute PanelReport on U.S. - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DSl 52/R (December 22, 1999), availableat http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp.
t' See id. 7.117 - 7.131. Paragraph 7.125 states:
We find that these statements by the [United States] express the unambiguous and
official position of the [United States] representing, in a manner that can be relied
upon by all Members, an undertaking that the discretion of the USTR has been limited so as to prevent a determination of inconsistency before exhaustion of DSU
proceedings.
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clearly WTO-illegal law may remain on the books as long as it is not enforced. This allowance lets the USTR continue to exercise its mandate under the legislation to conduct investigations and publish "watch lists" of
offending countries, as long as it takes no action without first exhausting the
WTO dispute settlement process. From the perspective of developing countries that frequently are the targets of pressure exerted "softly" through such
threats, this limitation may be very cold comfort. The bilateral exercises in
South Africa and Thailand, briefly described below, indicate the scope of
the potential chilling effect that such action can have.
South Africa
The human tragedy of the global AIDS epidemic often has been compared to the 14th century plague in Europe. Of the estimated 33.4 million
HIV-infected individuals around the world, about two thirds live in subSaharan Africa. Currently, between 20% to 26% of the population in some
southern African countries is infected." 9 One in eight South Africans is
HIV positive. Yet, the cost of HIV drugs is prohibitive to most Africans.' 20
In 1997, South Africa enacted legislation designed to give the Minister
of Health discretion to ensure the affordable supply of medicine.12' The law
allows the Minister to abrogate patent rights for exclusive marketing of a
particular medicine (compulsory licensing). 122 Additionally, the Minister
may license the right to import a substance registered in South Africa so
that the drug can be imported from any other country where it is manufactured (parallel importing),'2 3 The Medicines Act also contained a number
ld. at 17.125.
19 See David Satcher, The Global HIVIAIDS Epidemic, 281 J.A.M.A., No. 16 (Apr. 28,
1999), at http:I/jama.ama-assn.orglissuesfv28lnl6/ful/jsg9lOOl-l.html.
120 Combination anti-retroviral therapy costs about USD 12,000 in South Africa.
121See § 15C of Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of 1965 (as amended
1997), JSRSA 1997 vol. 3 at 1-63 [hereinafter Medicines Act].
122 The Medicines Act states:
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medicines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in particular may... determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent
granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine which
has been put onto the market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her consent.
Id. at 1-64.
123 The Medicines Act, Section 15C (b), allows the Minister to
prescribe the conditions on which any medicine [thati is identical in composition,
meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the same proprietary name as
that of another medicine already registered in the Republic, but [that] is imported by a
person other than the person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the
medicine already registered and [that] originates from any site of manufacture of the
original manufacturer as approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be
imported.

400

InternationalGovernance Through TradeAgreements
21:379 (2001)

of other provisions aimed at reducing medicine costs and assuring quality.
These provisions prompted a political storm initiated by the multinational
research pharmaceutical industry concerned about the global effect that
South Africa's actions would have on securing patent rights to pharmaceuticals.124

There is little doubt that a country such as South Africa can legally address the AIDS crisis by invoking its TRIPS authority to grant compulsory
licenses for the importation or local manufacture of essential drugs.'2' Indeed, as discussed above, TRIPS does not prohibit the use of parallel imports. Nonetheless, according to the South African Director General of
Health, parallel imports were to be strictly controlled: "[I]t has never been
the intention of the Department to allow for the unbridled importation of
drugs or the flooding of the market with unsafe products.', 126 The broad
wording of the statute, however, raises the question of whether the Medicines Act adheres to the highly restrictive TRIPS approach to compulsory
licensing. In 1998 and 1999, the USTR placed South Africa on its "Watch
List", implicating the Medicines Act's "ill-defined authority to issue compulsory licenses, authorize parallel imports and potentially otherwise abrogate patent rights.' ' 127 Maintaining that parallel imports are TRIPS-illegal,
the United States actively engaged in bilateral negotiations in an effort to
achieve the "repeal, termination or withdrawal" of Article 15C of the Medicines Act. 128 The diplomatic offensive included the suspension of four
tariff treatment under the Generalized
items from receiving preferential
129
System of Preferences ("GSP").
1d.
124 See PhRMA, Issues & Policy: PriorityForeignCountries, South Africa--Intellectual
Property Protection, at http://www.phrma.org/issues/nte/safrica.html (Sept 26, 1999)
(photocopy on file with author). A group of 40 multinational pharmaceutical companies
brought suit in South Africa, challenging the constitutionality of the Medicines Act.
125 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31. See the discussion of compulsory licensing, supra.
126
Olive Shisana, New Medicines Bill Will Benefit Consumers, at http://www.polity.org.
za/govdocs/pr/1997/prO821ahtnil (Aug. 21, 1997). Dr. Shisana served as the Director General of Health for South Africa.
127Special 301 Annual Review, supra note 7. Among South Africa's offenses was leadership of "a faction of nations in the WHO... calling for a reduction in the level of protection 2provided
for pharmaceuticals in TRIPS." Id.
18 See U.S. Government Efforts to Negotiate the Repeal, Termination or Withdrawal of
Article 15C of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1965 (Dep't of
State Feb. 5, 1999) [hereinafter U.S. Government Efforts], available at http:fl
vww.cptech.orglip/health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html. This action was required by the Onibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 (Pub. L. No.
105-277).
29 See U.S. Government Efforts, supra note 128. The GSP is a GATT exception to the
most-favored-nation rule that allows developed countries to extend tariff reductions on a bilateral basis to developing countries.
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An explosion of publicity generated by AIDS activists in the United
States ensued, and the U.S. government backed off its more aggressive
stance.1 30 The two countries reached an understanding. The United States
recognized South Africa's urgent need for more affordable health care in
the context of the AIDS epidemic, and it pledged an end to the issue and
restoration of GSP privileges in exchange for assurances that 13in implementing its health policy, South Africa would comply with TRIPS. '
Thailand
Thailand also has been hard-hit by AIDS, where only 5% of the estimated one million HIV-infected individuals can afford the two-drug antiretroviral regime prescribed to them.1 32 The cost of triple therapy is USD
675 a month, whereas the average monthly wage of an office worker is
USD120.33 With an active generic industry, and limited protection of exclusive marketing rights, Thailand successfully has reduced the prices of
some drugs. When the antifungal fluconazole lost its exclusive marketing4
rights, competition from three local producers reduced the price by 95%.
Thailand's Government Pharmaceutical Organization ("GPO") has been
producing generic AZT for a quarter of the price of the brand name version
for several years. 35 The government has balked, however, at activist pressure to grant a compulsory license for the drug didanosine ("ddi"), owned
by Bristol-Myers-Squibb. If the Thai Public Health Minister had authorized
the compulsory license, it would have been the first instance of compulsory
licensing under Article 31 of TRIPS, but the looming trade pressure was
sufficient to forestall the issuing of a compulsory license. 36 Because one
quarter of Thailand's exports are directed to the United States, the threat of
trade sanctions has powerful influence. 37 Not surprisingly, Thailand's

130See, e.g., Charles R. Babcock, AIDS Activists Dog Gore a 2 "dDay, WASH. POST, June
18, 1999, at A12. Activists targeted campaigning Vice President Gore, who was involved in
negotiations through leadership of the U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission.
13 See Press Release, USTR, U.S.-South Afica Understandingon IntellectualProperty,
(Sept.
19, 1999), availableat http://www.ustr.gov/releases1999/09/99-76.html.
32
1 See Sutin Wannabovorn, Thais Protest U.S. Firm's AIDS Drug Monopoly, at
http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/991222/bq/html (Dec. 22, 1999) (photocopy on file with author).
Thailand
has a population of 61 million.
133 See Global Trade and Access to Medicines: AIDS Treatments in Thailand, 354
LANCET
1893, 1894 Nov. 27, 1999 [hereinafter Global Trade andAccess to Medicines].
134 See id. Fluconazole treats cryptococcal meningitis, an opportunistic infection that
one in five AIDS patients in Thailand.
strikes
135 See Wannabovorn, supranote 132.
.36 See Aphaluck Bhatiasevi, Korn Refers Drug Call to Council of State - Activists Say
Fears ofBacklash Unfounded, BANGKOK POST, December 25, 1999 (photocopy on file with
author).
137
See Global Trade andAccess to Medicines,supranote 133.
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landed it on the Special 301 Priority and
weak enforcement of patents has
1 38
Priority Watch Lists in the past.
Although the Thai government backed away from issuing a compulsory license in the ddi case, mounting pressure, both from within developing countries and from international organizations, such as Medecins Sans
Fronti~res, triggered a compromise gesture from the industry. Five multinational pharmaceutical companies (Germany's Boehringen Ingelheim,
U.S.-based Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck, Glaxo Wellcome of the
United Kingdom, and Hoffrman-La Roche of Switzerland) agreed to provide
AIDS treatments at reduced rates to developing countries through the
access.139
United Nations as part of a broader initiative to improve treatment
Treatment advocates are skeptical about this foreign aid approach to solving
the affordability crisis. The use of compulsory licenses would allow countries to have more sustainable control over the availability of medicines,
rather than relying on patented drugs produced by multinational manufacturers, which will continue to be more expensive.
Truce
On December 1, 1999 (World AIDS Day) in the midst of the highly
contentious Seattle WTO Ministerial meeting, President Clinton announced
that the U.S. trade policy would consider poor countries' need for lifesaving
drugs, and would no longer oppose compulsory licensing or parallel importing where there exists a "healthcare emergency, particularly in respect of
[sic] HIV-AIDS.,', 41 Countries may review particular medicines on a caseby-case basis, and where there is a determination of emergent need, they
may grant a compulsory license after negotiating with the patent-holder.
The statement represents a retreat in U.S. policy to TRIPS/NAFTA level
protections of intellectual property. 42 However, clear standards are yet to
138
See, e.g., USTR Reviews Whether to Restore Thailand'sGSP Benefits Lost in 1989, 11
Rep. (BNA) 1176 (1994).
Int'l 3Trade
19 See New Public/PrivateSector Effort Initiatedto Accelerate Access to HIV/AIDS Care
and Treatment in DevelopingCountries (May 11, 2000) at http://www.unaids.orglwhatsnewl
pressfeng/pressarcO0/geneval 10500.html.
"4o
See, e.g., Kelvin Ng, Rights-Thailand:Struggling to [...] HIV Drugs Cheaper, Interpress Service (June 26, 2000), at http:/vww.oneworlctorg/ips2/juneOO13_20_037.html.
41
' Frances Williams, US. to Consider Poor Countries' Need for Drugs, Fin. TviMns
(London), Dec. 3, 1999, at 6.
142At the request of Health Gap Coalition, a U.S.-based international AIDS activist
group, the USTR sent a letter, which was later copied to the Thai government, to the head of
a Thai non-governmental organization stating the U.S. commitment that the "application of
U.S. trade law related to intellectual property remains sufficiently flexible to respond to public health crises." The letter further stated that "[i]f the Thai government determines that issuing a compulsory license is required to address its health care crisis, the United States will
raise no objection, provided the compulsory license is issued in a manner fully consistent
with the WTO Agreement on TRIPS. Letter from Joseph S. Papovich, Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for Services, Investment and Intellectual Property, to Mr. Paisan Tan-Ud,
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be articulated. In granting compulsory licenses, local officials must be willing to "test" the United States and respond to legal challenges at the domestic and international level, as well as to the threat of unilateral sanctions.
Governments are walking a tightrope between pressing health needs, increasing pressures from domestic constituencies and the cost of challenging
international pharmaceutical interests. As a political matter, the Clinton
announcement in Seattle illustrates the importance of maintaining support
from transnational groups that can counter the political pressure exercised
by pharmaceutical companies.' 43
Adjudicating compulsory licensing and unilateral responses before the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body is problematic. Despite the relative expediency of the process, parties may wait a year or more for a determination.
Worse, the adjudication process would place the WTO dispute panel in the
politically unsavory position of evaluating whether a true "health emergency" existed, and whether the country in question engaged in sufficient
negotiations with the license holder.1 4
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
As a strategy for promoting investment in the essential drug needs of
the developing world, universal intellectual property protection hardly is
optimal. Diseases suffered by populations with no purchasing power are
not going to be addressed by commercial producers. In fact, treatments for
some tropical diseases have begun to disappear from the market due to lack
of effective demand, despite significant need. 145 Of the over 1,200 new
drugs commercialized between 1975 and 1997, 30% are considered therapeutic innovations, but only 1%are specifically for tropical diseases.146 - Of
these, only four may be considered the direct product of research and development activity in the pharmaceutical industry (the rest came out of veterinary research or military research or were updated versions of existing
Chairman of PHA Network of Thailand, (Jan. 27,2000), availableat http://www.cptech.org/
ip/health/c/tbailand/ustrlettejan27.htrnl.
43
' See Sabin Russell, World Trade Showdown; Activists, Industry Split Over AIDS
Drugs,S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1999, atAl (describing the role of James Love, director of the
Consumer Project on Technology, and other health and activist organizations in placing the
issue before the U.S. public and on the international agenda). In January of 2000, Vice
President (and then-Presidential candidate) Albert Gore brought the issue of the international
AIDS crisis before the United Nations Security Council in an unprecedented gesture toward
raising a health issue to the level of an international security concern.
'" See generally Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, supra note 31 (describing the difficulties of
using the dispute settlement mechanism for inquiring into government decisions "at the borders"5 of the TRIPS agreement).
14 See Bernard Pecoul et al., Access to EssentialDrugs in Poor Countries,A Lost Battle?, 281 J.A.M.A. 361, 364 (1999) (giving examples of medicines for epidemic bacterial
meningitis and leishmaniasis).
14 See id.
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products.) 147 AIDS is anomalous in that drugs were developed for use in
the North, even though the vast majority of sufferers live in developing
countries.
From Conflict to Cooperation

Efforts to create viable markets have been undertaken by collaborations among public, nonprofit, and private entities. For example, WHO together with foundations and nonprofit organizations recently announced an
effort to raise at least $500 million to halt the spread of drug-resistant tuberculosis. 14
Buttressing purchasing power, however, only partially will
address the issue of inaccessible pricing. Public or nonprofit initiatives also
must increase funding flows for research in essential areas,' 49 and also can
consider opportunities to act within the market as intellectual property
rights holders. Rather than conceive of intellectual property as only a zero
sum game between assuring return on investment or facilitating widespread
access, creative uses of this valuable asset can be deployed.1 50
A pioneering example of this approach is the International AIDS Vaccine Initiative ("IAVI"), a nonprofit group that has funded AIDS vaccine
development in the academy and the private sector. Funding recipients
agree to allow the nonprofit to file patents for discoveries where investigators choose not to do so. Otherwise, IAVI retains flexible rights to the
intellectual property. The licensing agreements stipulate, for example, that
price must be kept at no more than 10% of production costs.'
Socializing the Risk in Research
147 See

id.
'4 See Judith Miller, In FightAgainst Tuberculosis,Experts Look for PrivateHelp, N.Y.
TIMEs,
Nov. 2, 1999, atA8.
149 The recently launched "Medicines for Malaria Venture" involves a partnership among
international pharmaceutical companies, WHO, the World Bank, government agencies, and
the Rockefeller Foundation to engage in drug discovery and development for malaria. See
Elizabeth Olson, Drug Groups and UN. Offices Join to Develop Malaria Cures, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1999, atA5.
0See J.H. Reichman and David Lange, BargainingAround the TRIPS Agreement: The
Case for Ongoing Public-PrivateInitiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions,9 DuKE J. CohM. & INT'L L. 11 (1998). Reichman and Lange discuss TRIPS
as a non-cooperative enterprise. Because developing countries will have difficulty implementing the high standards as a result of the unacceptably high social costs, the authors advocate using the agreement as a set of "default rules" around which governments and private
investors can negotiate transactions on a case-by-case basis. Applying this theory in the
copyright field, the authors view this kind of private "deal-making" as a way to increase investment in developing countries.
151
IAVI maintains options to make use of the intellectual property rights to produce a
vaccine for the developing world under certain circumstances. See Press Release, IAVI,
Two Innovative AIDS Vaccine Development Partnerships Launched (Nov. 26, 1998).
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Although these nascent strategies are far from commonplace, they
point toward a conscious role for government, nonprofits, and philanthropists to rethink policy and strategically view themselves as economic actors
in the market to obtain social goals. Progress in this area may evolve more
readily from the nonprofit sector than from governments, as it is more
flexible, independent, and can act on transnational interests that do not have
formal access to national and international public fora. Nonprofits involved
in medical research and international health promotion can take a proactive
stance within the market and within the policy community based on a strategic assessment of the current status of the pharmaceutical industry and the
third sector's (and public sector's) involvement as economic actors. The
industry has undergone dramatic change in the last decade. Research and
marketing costs are rising at the same time that an explosion of new technology, such as the emergence of biotechnology, and the ability to screen
candidate substances at an accelerated rate are fundamentally changing the
nature of pharmaceutical research and development. Large pharmaceutical
companies increasingly are merging in an effort to save duplication of efforts in research and marketing, but it is in smaller research firms, often
spinning off of university laboratories, that the most innovative and cost efficient research is taking place.' 52 The latter often are research rich but cash
poor, and increasingly are licensing their technology to large pharmaceutical companies for development.
Estimates vary on the actual cost of developing a drug from discovery
to market.'53 Citing a 1997 study in Pharmacoeconomics, Pecoul et al. state
an average of $160 million over a period of 8 to 12 years. Industry representatives claim that the amount is closer to $500 million in a 12 to 15 year
period. 154 Industry observers often point out that most large pharmaceutical
research companies spend twice as much on marketing than on research.155
This disparity can be partly attributed to an accounting problem related to
research and development. Money invested in research is a "sunk cost."
Much like overhead, the value generated from that investment will not be
realized for many years, but the expense must be recorded in the year it is
made, rather than capitalized over time.'5 6 At the moment, there is very lit152 See Addicted to Mergers?, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 6, 1999, at 8.

'53 See Danzon, supra note 25, at 5. Danzon estimated that average after-tax cost of drug
development in the United States in 1993 was $194 million, based on data from the Office of
Technology Assessment ("OTA"). Included in that figure was a 10% annual allowance for

forgone
capital.
54

1 See PhRMA Policy Papers:Strong PatentProtection is Essential (Sept. 26, 1999), at
http://wvww.phnna.org/issues/protect.html (photocopy on file with author).
'55 See Addicted to Mergers?, supra note 152, at 88, showing expenditures in research
and development as 13% and marketing and sales as 29% of sales revenues.
156 Thus, given the time value of money, the actual expense/risk to the industry is higher
than income statements reflect See Danzon, supranote 25, at 5-8.
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tie clarity regarding the actual link between patent protection and innovation in essential medicines.
James Love has pointed out that many of the breakthrough AIDS
medications (and other essential drugs) were developed through funding
from the U.S. National Institute for Health ("NIH") with public money, and
licensed to private industry for manufacturing and marketing. 57 A recent
New York Times report details the transformation in the research rewards
wrought by a 1980 law intended to spur commercialization of inventions. 5 8
The law permitted university researchers with public grants to license discoveries to private companies for development. The result has produced a
high stakes search for "blockbuster" drugs in university laboratories, the
creation of commercial spin-offs from academic research, and a shift away
from exclusively basic research to later-stage drug development by academic researchers, leading many pharmaceutical companies to "outsource"
discovery and development efforts that previously had been conducted inhouse. Provisions in the law that allowed the government to intervene in
order to obtain the benefits of tax sponsored research free of royalties have
not been utilized; in fact, according to the General Accounting Office, the
Health Institutes have not tracked the flow of this investment and the resulting inventions. 15 9
V. CONCLUSION
Over the long-term, the pharmaceutical industry may be fragmenting
into research, development, and manufacturing and marketing functions.
This situation may provide significant opportunities for increased publicly
responsive control over the fruits of innovation. A general lack of transparent analysis on investment in research, the interaction of public and private
resources, and the role of university researchers in disseminating (or retaining and commercializing) knowledge is a major obstacle to public discourse
on a truly rational pharmaceuticals policy. On the international plane, trade
agreements serve to obfuscate the problem by channeling resolution of conflicts through a regime of elaborately articulated property "rights."
Resolutions to the affordability conundrum are only part of a larger
public health challenge to the infectious disease crisis in the developing
world, or even the cancer and heart disease complaints of developed world.
However, the mechanisms for intellectual property protection established
through the trade agreements are ill-suited to overcome this dilemma. Not
157 For more discussion of this, see documents at http://www.cpteck-org, especially the

letter from Ralph Nader, James Love, and Robert Weissman to Dr. Harold Varmus, Director
of NIH, asking for NIH to give the WHO access to U.S. government-funded medical inventions58(Sept. 3, 1999).
1 See Gerth and Stolberg, supra note 45 (discussing Public Law 96-517, the Bayh-Dole
Act,5935 U.S.C. 200 etseq.).
1 See id.
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only do they operate in an incongruous context, they also are not reflective
of the actual nature of the transnational interests affected by policy outcomes. While the fights of intellectual property holders are enshrined at the
international level, the balancing of public health and consumer needs remains a residual category relegated to the domestic sphere.

